Justia Corporate Compliance Opinion Summaries

Carhart and Halaska own CHI. CHI terminated its sales agent, MRO, which filed a federal suit for breach of contract. Carhart bought MRO’s claim for $150,000 and became the plaintiff in a suit against a company of which he was a half owner. Halaska then sued Carhart in Wisconsin state court for breach of fiduciary duties to CHI and Halaska by becoming the plaintiff and by writing checks on CHI bank accounts without approval, depositing payments owed CHI into Carhart’s own account, and withholding accounting and other financial information from Halaska. A receiver was appointed, informed the federal court that CHI had no assets out of which to pay a lawyer, and consented to entry of a $242,000 default judgment (the amount sought by Carhart), giving Carhart a potential profit of $92,000 on his purchase of MRO’s claim. In Carhart’s suit to execute that judgment, CHI’s only asset was its Wisconsin suit against Carhart. The court ordered the sale of CHI’s lawsuit at public auction; Carhart, the only bidder, bought it for $10,000, ending all possibility that CHI could proceed against him for his alleged plundering of the company. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Auctioning off the lawsuit placed Carhart ahead of CHI’s other creditors. Carhart was not a purchaser in good faith. No valid interest is impaired by rescinding the sale, enabling CHI to prosecute its suit against Carhart. View "Carhart v. Carhart-Halaska Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

These appeals both involved damages actions by stockholder plaintiffs arising out of mergers in which the controlling stockholder, who had representatives on the board of directors, acquired the remainder of the shares that it did not own in a Delaware public corporation. Both mergers were negotiated by special committees of independent directors, were ultimately approved by a majority of the minority stockholders, and were at substantial premiums to the pre-announcement market price. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Chancery in each case, contending that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty by approving transactions that were unfair to the minority stockholders. In both appeals, it was undisputed that the companies did not follow the process established in "Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corporation" as a safe harbor to invoke the business judgment rule in the context of a self-interested transaction. In both cases, the defendant directors were insulated from liability for monetary damages for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care by an exculpatory charter provision adopted in accordance with 8 Del. C. 102(b)(7). Despite that provision, the plaintiffs in each case sued the controlling stockholders and their affiliated directors, and also sued the independent directors who had negotiated and approved the mergers. The issue central to both, presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether, where the plaintiff challenges an interested transaction that is presumptively subject to entire fairness review, must plead a non-exculpated claim against the disinterested, independent directors to survive a motion to dismiss by those directors. The Court answered that question in the affirmative: a plaintiff seeking only monetary damages must plead non-exculpated claims against a director who is protected by an exculpatory charter provision to survive a motion to dismiss, regardless of the underlying standard of review for the board's conduct. The Court of Chancery in both of these cases denied the defendants' motions to dismiss because it read the Supreme Court's precedent to require doing so, regardless of the exculpatory provision in each company's certificate of incorporation. When the independent directors are protected by an exculpatory charter provision and the plaintiffs are unable to plead a non-exculpated claim against them, those directors are entitled to have the claims against them dismissed, in keeping with the Court's opinion in "Malpiede v. Townson" (and cases following that decision). Accordingly, the Court remanded both of these cases to allow the Court of Chancery to determine if the plaintiffs sufficiently pled non-exculpated claims against the independent directors. View "In Re Cornerstone Theraputics, Inc. Leal, et al. v. Meeks, et al." on Justia Law

Drake and Brian each owned a 50 percent interest in the corporations; in the limited liability companies, they held different interests. Drake and Brian were each a director, officer, and shareholder or member of each of the companies. Seyde was also involved in two of the companies. Drake filed suit alleging multiple types of misconduct against Brian and Seyde and seeking involuntary dissolution. Brian filed a cross complaint. The trial court denied Brian’s motion to stay dissolution of the corporations and limited liability companies and appoint appraisers to permit a buyout to occur (Corp. Code, 2000, 17707.03). The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that, as a result of Drake’s dismissal of the dissolution claim, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider a motion for buyout. View "Kennedy v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Robl and Homoly formed the Company to develop real estate. Robl held a 60% share and Homoly held 40%. Steve Robl was the tax matters partner; his wife, accountant Vera Robl, assisted with financial records; Homoly was a project manager. From 2006-2011, the Company operated at a loss. Robl periodically advanced money. The operating agreement required the consent of both members before “creation of any obligation or commitment of the Company, including the borrowing of funds, in excess of $10,000; [and] . . . . Any act which would cause a Member, absent such Member’s written consent, to become personally liable for any debt or obligation of the Company.” Vera notified Homoly that the Company needed “to make a capital call or increase loans on existing inventory,” that Robl had “put in $71,500 so if you go the route of capital call, your share to get caught up would be $47,666.” Homoly responded, “I would prefer the money from Robl to be considered a loan ... If Steve would rather me put in a capital call, however, I will … write the check.” In 2011, Robl sued for breach of contract, seeking $172,617.61. The district court entered summary judgment, finding that Homoly did not personally guarantee any loan. The Eighth Circuit reversed. The record showed that the parties genuinely dispute whether Homoly authorized Robl’s loan and personally guaranteed repayment. View "Robl Constr., Inc. v. Homoly" on Justia Law

Menard operated a store in a building subleased from Wal-Mart. In 2006, Menard entered into a Purchase Agreement (PA) with Dial; Clauff signed as a managing member of Dial. Menard planned to build a store and wanted to be relieved of its obligations under the sublease. Menard and Dial agreed that Dial would assume responsibility for the sublease after Menard opened its new store. With Wal-Mart’s consent, DKC (Chauff's other LLC) and Menard executed an Assignment. Clauff purported to sign as a member of DKC. DKC did not file Articles of Organization until later. Clauff and Menard claim, but neither provided evidence, that DKC adopted the Assignment after the company formed. Menard remained secondarily liable. Menard opened its new store in 2008. When the Sublease expired in 2011, Wal-Mart was owed more than $700,000. Menard paid $350,000 and sued Dial, DKC, and Clauff. The district court granted summary judgment, finding Clauff liable under Nebraska Revised Statute 21-2635: "[a]ll persons who assume to act as a limited liability company without authority to do so shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities of the company." The Eighth Circuit reversed for determination of whether common law or section 21-2635 preclude Clauff's argument that his liability may be avoided because DKC adopted the contract and commenced performance. View "Menard, Inc. v. Clauff" on Justia Law

Miller, an African-American male, worked as a cook for Hospitality’s Sparx Restaurant. Miller became assistant kitchen manager and was a satisfactory employee. On October 1, 2010, Miler discovered racially offensive pictures at the kitchen cooler. Miller lodged a complaint. Two employees admitted responsibility. The manager agreed that the posting was a termination-worthy offense, but one offender was given a warning and the other was not disciplined. Soon after Miller’s complaint, supervisors began to criticize Miller’s work performance. Sparx fired Miller on October 23, 2010. The EEOC filed suit on Miller’s behalf under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), 3(a). Before trial, Sparx had closed and Hospitality had dissolved. The court concluded that successor corporations could be liable. The jury awarded $15,000 in compensatory damages on the retaliation claim. The EEOC sought additional remedies. The district court denied the front-pay request but awarded Miller $43,300.50 in back pay (and interest) plus $6,495.00 to offset impending taxes on the award; enjoined the companies from discharging employees in retaliation for complaints against racially offensive postings; and required them to adopt policies, investigative processes, and annual training consistent with Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to both successor liability and the equitable remedies. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. N. Star Hospitality, Inc" on Justia Law

Section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 created an arbitration procedure for automobile dealerships to seek continuation or reinstatement of franchise agreements that had been terminated by Chrysler during bankruptcy proceedings, with the approval of the bankruptcy court. After an arbitral decision favoring the dealer, the manufacturer was required to provide the dealer a “customary and usual letter of intent” to enter into a sales and service agreement. After arbitrations, a trial was held to determine whether Chrysler supplied each prevailing dealer with such a letter. Most of the rejected dealers reached settlements with New Chrysler. The court determined that the remaining dealers had received “customary and usual” letters. The Sixth Circuit agreed that section 747 does not constitute an unconstitutional legislative reversal of a federal court judgment and that the only relief it provides to successful dealers is the issuance of a letter of intent. The letters at issue were “customary and usual,” except one contractual provision that required reversal. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion application Michigan and Nevada state dealer acts is preempted by section 747, because those acts provide for redetermination of factors directly addressed in federally-mandated arbitrations closely related to a major federal bailout. View "Chrysler Grp. LLC v. Sowell Auto., Inc." on Justia Law

Shareholders are required to make a “demand” on the corporation’s board of directors before filing a derivative suit, unless they sufficiently allege that demand would be futile. Before Arduini filed his derivative action against IGT and its board, four shareholders filed derivative suits that were consolidated. They argued that a demand was excused because: the IGT board extended the employment contract of IGT’s former CEO and chairman of IGT’s board of directors, and allowed him to resign rather than terminating him for cause; three directors received such high compensation from IGT that their ability to impartially consider a demand was compromised; six directors faced a substantial likelihood of liability for breaches of their fiduciary duties as committee members; and that other members had engaged in insider trading. The district court dismissed the consolidated suit for failure to make a demand or sufficiently allege futility; the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The district court then dismissed Arduini’s action, holding that Arduini had failed to make a demand and could not allege demand futility based on issue preclusion due to its ruling in the prior suit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that under Nevada law and these facts, issue preclusion barred relitigation of futility. View "Arduini v. Int'l Gaming Tech." on Justia Law

The Everetts formerly operated a PDRI franchise. After that franchise was terminated, they violated a non-compete clause. Only Mr. Everett and the Everetts’ corporation actually signed the franchise agreement. PDRI sought to bind Ms. Everett to an arbitration award pursuant to the franchise agreement. Although Everett was a non-signatory to the franchise agreement, PDRI asserted she was subject to arbitration under the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel. The district court determined that the benefits Everett received were filtered through her ownership interest in their corporation or through her husband and were therefore indirect. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Everett did receive a direct benefit. It is clear that the Everetts’ corporation was formed to gain the benefit of the franchise agreement and was used only to conduct the business of the franchise; Ms. Everett had a 50% ownership and played an active role in running the corporation. View "Everett v. Paul Davis Restoration, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a shareholder derivative action on behalf of Deckers to recover damages he claimed it suffered because of misconduct by Deckers' officers and directors. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer with leave to amend but plaintiff elected not to file an amended complaint. The trial court subsequently dismissed the complaint and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that discovery is not available to a person seeking to qualify as a plaintiff in a shareholder derivative action involving a Delaware corporation. Plaintiff must comply with the particularized pleading requirement of Rule 23.1 without the assistance of Deckers, its officers, or board of directors. Plaintiff, instead, should consult and use the "tools at hand," such as an inspection demand or taking the steps necessary to obtain the facts from publicly available SEC filings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal. View "Jones v. Martinez (Deckers Outdoor Corp.)" on Justia Law