Justia Corporate Compliance Opinion Summaries

Northbound generates and sells life insurance leads, using the brand name “Leadbot,” but ran out of cash with a frozen line of credit and revenue that did not support its overhead. Norvax generates and sells health insurance leads. An asset purchase agreement was signed in 2009, “by and between” Northbound and Leadbot LLC, a subsidiary of Norvax that was formed to purchase the assets of Northbound. Under the agreement, Leadbot LLC was obligated to use the assets it acquired from Northbound in furtherance of the Leadbot brand. The purchase price was not paid in cash. Instead Northbound would receive an “earn-out” calculated as a percentage of the monthly net revenue of Leadbot LLC. The agreement also contained an Illinois choice-of-law clause. Northbound claims that Leadbot LLC and Norvax violated the agreement. The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment for defendants on the remainder. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Norvax was not actually a party to the contract that was allegedly breached, nor is there any basis for holding Norvax liable for any breach by a subsidiary. View "Northbound Grp., Inc. v. Norvax, Inc." on Justia Law

ManWeb, an Indianapolis engineering and installation company, entered into an asset purchase agreement with Tiernan, another Indianapolis electrical contractor. Unlike ManWeb, Tiernan was party to a collective bargaining agreement with a union, under which it contributed to a multiemployer pension fund. After the asset purchase, Tiernan ceased operations. Although ManWeb continued to do the same type of work in the jurisdiction, ManWeb did not make contributions. Counsel for the Plan sent a letter to Tiernan’s former address, stating that the company had effectuated a complete withdrawal from the Plan and, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461, the Plan had assessed withdrawal liability against Tiernan of $661,978.00. The letter was forwarded to ManWeb’s address and signed for by a ManWeb employee. No payments were made, nor was review or arbitration requested, despite the availability of both under the statute. The Plan filed a collection action, adding ManWeb as a defendant under a theory of successor liability. The district court granted the Plan partial summary judgment, finding that Tiernanr had waived its right to dispute the assessment of withdrawal liability, but rejected the claim of successor liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed to allow the district court to address the successor liability continuity requirement. View "Tsareff v. Manweb Services, Inc." on Justia Law

H & Q and the Doll Companies owned membership units of Double D Excavating, LLC. The Doll Companies opened account 121224 in the name of "Double D Excavating" and deposited a check payable to the LLC and opened account 119992 in the name of David Doll. The Doll Companies deposited into Account 121224 multiple payments that LLC customers made to the LLC and then transferred funds from Account 121224 to Account 119992, commingled funds from Account 119992 with funds belonging to the Doll Companies, and used those funds to pay Doll Companies' expenses. H&Q claims that the Doll Companies failed to give notice or obtain consent for any of those activities and represented to H&Q that the LLC was struggling financially and needed additional financial assistance. The Doll Companies contributed a portion of the funds from Account 119992 back to the LLC and, according to H&Q, represented to H&Q that these were fresh capital contributions. H&Q also invested additional capital. After discovering the Doll Companies' alleged conduct, H&Q filed suit asserting state law claims and claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that the complaint did not sufficiently allege any racketeering activity. View "H & Q Props, Inc. v. Doll" on Justia Law

Trinity, a New York Episcopal parish, owns Wal-Mart stock and requested that Wal-Mart include its shareholder proposal in Wal-Mart’s proxy materials. Trinity’s proposal, linked to Wal-Mart’s sale of high-capacity firearms at about one-third of its 3,000 stores, asked Board of Directors to develop and implement standards for use in deciding whether to sell a product that “especially endangers public safety,” “has the substantial potential to impair the reputation of Wal-Mart,” and/or “would reasonably be considered by many offensive to the family and community values integral to the Company’s promotion of its brand.” The Securities and Exchange Commission’s “ordinary business” exclusion lets a company omit a shareholder proposal from proxy materials if the proposal relates to ordinary business operations. Wal-Mart obtained a “no-action letter” from the SEC, indicating that there would be no recommendation of an enforcement action against Wal-Mart if it omitted the proposal from its proxy materials. Trinity filed suit. The district court held that, because the proposal concerned the company’s Board (rather than management) and focused principally on governance (rather than how Wal-Mart decides what to sell), it was outside ordinary business operations. The Third Circuit reversed. “Stripped to its essence, Trinity’s proposal goes to the heart of Wal-Mart’s business: what it sells on its shelves.” View "Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Hill International, Inc., David Richter, Camille Andrews, Brian Clymer, Alan Fellheimer, Irvin Richter, Steven Kramer and Gary Mazzucco sought review of Court of Chancery orders dated June 5, 2015 and June 16, 2015. In its June 5, 2015 Order, the Court of Chancery enjoined Hill from conducting any business at its June 9, 2015 Annual Meeting, other than convening the meeting for the sole purpose of adjourning it for a minimum of 21 days, in order to permit plaintiff-appellee Opportunity Partners L.P. to present certain items of business and director nominations at Hill’s 2015 Annual Meeting. On June 16, 2015, the Court of Chancery entered the Order dated June 5, 2015 as a partial final judgment pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 54(b). This expedited appeal presented for the Supreme Court's resolution a dispute over the proper interpretation of certain provisions of Articles II and III of Hill’s Bylaws as Amended and Restated on November 12, 2007. The sections of the Bylaws at issue, specifically language in Sections 2.2 and 3.3, concerned the operative date for determining the time within which stockholders must give notice of any shareholder proposals or director nominees to be considered at Hill’s upcoming annual meeting. After review of the bylaws and the Court of Chancery's orders, the Supreme Court found reversible error and affirmed. View "Hill International, Inc., et al. v. Opportunity Partners, L.P." on Justia Law

Because a 1999 issue of cumulative preferred stock was impairing the company’s ability to raise capital, Emmis signed holders of 60% of the preferred shares to swaps. Emmis purchased shares; the owners delivered their shares to an escrow. Closing was deferred for five years, during which the sellers agreed to vote their shares as Emmis instructed. Emmis did this because, once it purchased any share outright, it would be retired and lose voting rights, Ind. Code 23-1-25-3(a). Emmis repurchased addition preferred stock in a tender offer and reissued it to a trust for bonuses to workers who stuck with the firm through the financial downturn. The trustee was to vote this stock at management’s direction. Senior managers and members of the board were excluded, leaving them free to propose and vote without a conflict of interest. The plans allowed Emmis to control more than 2/3 of the votes. Emmis then called on owners of common and preferred stock to vote on whether the terms of the preferred stock should be changed. The cumulative feature of the stock’s dividends and other rights were eliminated. Plaintiffs, who own remaining preferred stock, sued. The district court rejected claims under federal and Indiana law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Indiana, apparently alone among the states, allows a corporation to vote its own shares, which may be good, or may be bad, but the ability to negotiate better terms, or invest elsewhere, rather than judicially imposed “best practices,” is how corporate law protects investors View "Corre Opportunities Fund, LP v. Emmis Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

Carhart and Halaska own CHI. CHI terminated its sales agent, MRO, which filed a federal suit for breach of contract. Carhart bought MRO’s claim for $150,000 and became the plaintiff in a suit against a company of which he was a half owner. Halaska then sued Carhart in Wisconsin state court for breach of fiduciary duties to CHI and Halaska by becoming the plaintiff and by writing checks on CHI bank accounts without approval, depositing payments owed CHI into Carhart’s own account, and withholding accounting and other financial information from Halaska. A receiver was appointed, informed the federal court that CHI had no assets out of which to pay a lawyer, and consented to entry of a $242,000 default judgment (the amount sought by Carhart), giving Carhart a potential profit of $92,000 on his purchase of MRO’s claim. In Carhart’s suit to execute that judgment, CHI’s only asset was its Wisconsin suit against Carhart. The court ordered the sale of CHI’s lawsuit at public auction; Carhart, the only bidder, bought it for $10,000, ending all possibility that CHI could proceed against him for his alleged plundering of the company. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Auctioning off the lawsuit placed Carhart ahead of CHI’s other creditors. Carhart was not a purchaser in good faith. No valid interest is impaired by rescinding the sale, enabling CHI to prosecute its suit against Carhart. View "Carhart v. Carhart-Halaska Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

These appeals both involved damages actions by stockholder plaintiffs arising out of mergers in which the controlling stockholder, who had representatives on the board of directors, acquired the remainder of the shares that it did not own in a Delaware public corporation. Both mergers were negotiated by special committees of independent directors, were ultimately approved by a majority of the minority stockholders, and were at substantial premiums to the pre-announcement market price. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Chancery in each case, contending that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty by approving transactions that were unfair to the minority stockholders. In both appeals, it was undisputed that the companies did not follow the process established in "Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corporation" as a safe harbor to invoke the business judgment rule in the context of a self-interested transaction. In both cases, the defendant directors were insulated from liability for monetary damages for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care by an exculpatory charter provision adopted in accordance with 8 Del. C. 102(b)(7). Despite that provision, the plaintiffs in each case sued the controlling stockholders and their affiliated directors, and also sued the independent directors who had negotiated and approved the mergers. The issue central to both, presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether, where the plaintiff challenges an interested transaction that is presumptively subject to entire fairness review, must plead a non-exculpated claim against the disinterested, independent directors to survive a motion to dismiss by those directors. The Court answered that question in the affirmative: a plaintiff seeking only monetary damages must plead non-exculpated claims against a director who is protected by an exculpatory charter provision to survive a motion to dismiss, regardless of the underlying standard of review for the board's conduct. The Court of Chancery in both of these cases denied the defendants' motions to dismiss because it read the Supreme Court's precedent to require doing so, regardless of the exculpatory provision in each company's certificate of incorporation. When the independent directors are protected by an exculpatory charter provision and the plaintiffs are unable to plead a non-exculpated claim against them, those directors are entitled to have the claims against them dismissed, in keeping with the Court's opinion in "Malpiede v. Townson" (and cases following that decision). Accordingly, the Court remanded both of these cases to allow the Court of Chancery to determine if the plaintiffs sufficiently pled non-exculpated claims against the independent directors. View "In Re Cornerstone Theraputics, Inc. Leal, et al. v. Meeks, et al." on Justia Law

Drake and Brian each owned a 50 percent interest in the corporations; in the limited liability companies, they held different interests. Drake and Brian were each a director, officer, and shareholder or member of each of the companies. Seyde was also involved in two of the companies. Drake filed suit alleging multiple types of misconduct against Brian and Seyde and seeking involuntary dissolution. Brian filed a cross complaint. The trial court denied Brian’s motion to stay dissolution of the corporations and limited liability companies and appoint appraisers to permit a buyout to occur (Corp. Code, 2000, 17707.03). The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that, as a result of Drake’s dismissal of the dissolution claim, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider a motion for buyout. View "Kennedy v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Robl and Homoly formed the Company to develop real estate. Robl held a 60% share and Homoly held 40%. Steve Robl was the tax matters partner; his wife, accountant Vera Robl, assisted with financial records; Homoly was a project manager. From 2006-2011, the Company operated at a loss. Robl periodically advanced money. The operating agreement required the consent of both members before “creation of any obligation or commitment of the Company, including the borrowing of funds, in excess of $10,000; [and] . . . . Any act which would cause a Member, absent such Member’s written consent, to become personally liable for any debt or obligation of the Company.” Vera notified Homoly that the Company needed “to make a capital call or increase loans on existing inventory,” that Robl had “put in $71,500 so if you go the route of capital call, your share to get caught up would be $47,666.” Homoly responded, “I would prefer the money from Robl to be considered a loan ... If Steve would rather me put in a capital call, however, I will … write the check.” In 2011, Robl sued for breach of contract, seeking $172,617.61. The district court entered summary judgment, finding that Homoly did not personally guarantee any loan. The Eighth Circuit reversed. The record showed that the parties genuinely dispute whether Homoly authorized Robl’s loan and personally guaranteed repayment. View "Robl Constr., Inc. v. Homoly" on Justia Law