Justia Corporate Compliance Opinion Summaries

At an L.O.M. stockholders’ meeting, stockholders raised concerns about sufficiency of notice, accuracy of proxy materials, and lack of current financial information. In response to a stockholder’s request, the President of L.O.M., Matthews, adjourned the meeting. Matthews and “numerous stockholders” departed. L.O.M.’s counsel then announced that the meeting had not adjourned and that a recess was being taken. A director then purported to preside over a resumed meeting, at which challenged directors were allegedly elected. The challenged directors took a number of actions, including approving L.O.M.’s 2012 stock option plan and firing Matthews. Defendants assert that after the meeting resumed, votes were counted, and challenged directors were elected by about 56% of outstanding shares; after the meeting, the challenged directors sent the stockholders a letter that informed the stockholders of the meeting’s results. In an action to determine the composition of the board, the chancellor denied a motion to dismiss. The chancellor acknowledged sympathy for defendants’ “real argument,” that in attempting to ratify the vote for the challenged directors, a majority of shares outstanding have, in effect, been voted for the challenged directors and that adjournment of the meeting was simply an attempt by Matthews to preserve himself in office.View "Gentili v. L.O.M. Med. Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Polar Holding was sole shareholder of PMC, a company engaged in the petroleum-additive business. PMC was in default on a loan for which it had pledged valuable intellectual property as collateral, and Polar Holding was in the midst of an internal dispute between members of its board of directors regarding business strategy for PMC. One of the directors, Socia, formed a competing company, Petroleum, for the purpose of acquiring PMC’s promissory note and collateral from the holder of PMC’s loan. Petroleum brought suit against Woodward, an escrow agent in possession of PMC’s collateral, alleging that PMC was in default on the payment of its promissory note. Polar Holding and PMC intervened and filed counterclaims against Petroleum and a third-party complaint against additional parties, including Socia. Polar Holding and PMC allleged breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference. After PMC filed for bankruptcy, its claims became the property of the bankruptcy trustee. Polar Holding’s claims were later dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a tortious interference claim as addressed by the district court, but reversed dismissal of a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim against Socia and a civil-conspiracy claim against individual third-party defendants.View "Petroleum Enhancer, L.L.C. v. Woodward" on Justia Law

Appellants Consipio Holding, BV; Ilan Bunimovitz; Tisbury Services, Inc.; and Claudio Gianascio (collectively, Consipio) are shareholders of Private Media Group, Inc. (PRVT). In August 2010, Consipio filed a complaint in the Nevada district court, seeking injunctive relief and the appointment of a receiver for PRVT. Consipio also asserted derivative claims on behalf of PRVT against PRVT's former CEO and president, Berth H. Milton, Jr., and against officer and director respondents Johan Carlberg (PRVT director), Peter Dixinger (PRVT director), Bo Rodebrant (PRVT director), Johan Gillborg (former PRVT CFO), and Philip Christmas (PRVT subsidiary CFO). The claims focused on respondents' alleged conduct in assisting Milton, Jr., to financially harm PRVT for their personal gain. The complaint alleged that respondents assisted Milton, Jr., in obtaining significant loans for himself and entities he controls. It further stated that respondents failed to demand repayment on these loans and that they helped Milton, Jr. by removing funds from PRVT and concealing the wrongdoing. Given these allegations, Consipio contended that respondents collectively were guilty of misfeasance, malfeasance, and breach of their fiduciary duties. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Nevada courts could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident officers and directors who directly harm a Nevada corporation. The Court concluded that they can. In this case, the district court failed to conduct adequate factual analysis to determine whether it could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondents before dismissing the complaint against them. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the dismissal order and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings.View "Consipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg" on Justia Law

Petitioner Lisa McBride was an accountant who worked as Respondent Peak Wellness Center’s business manager for about nine years. Peak terminated her in 2009, citing job performance and morale issues. Petitioner claimed she was terminated in retaliation for bringing various accounting improprieties to the attention of Peak’s Board of Directors. Petitioner brought several federal and state-law claims against Peak: (1) whistleblower retaliation under the federal False Claims Act (FCA); (2) violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); (3) breach of employment contract; (4) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) defamation; and (6) a federal sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. After discovery, Peak moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district court granted the motion. Petitioner appealed, arguing that significant issues of material fact remained unresolved and that her claims should have proceeded to trial. She also appealed district court’s denial of an evidentiary motion. Finding no error in the district court’s decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed its grant of summary judgment in favor of Peak.View "McBride v. Peak Wellness Center Inc." on Justia Law

A jury returned a special verdict that: (a) awarded damages against an attorney and his girlfriend based upon the jury's finding that they had breached their fiduciary duties to a former client of the attorney by purchasing half of his stock in a closely held corporation for less than its fair market value; and (b) cancelled debts owing by the corporation to the attorney and his girlfriend based upon the jury's finding that they had breached their fiduciary duties to a shareholder, the former client's widow, by making loans to the corporation. The district court granted a new trial on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict, and this appeal followed. Finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of a new trial.View "Berry v. McFarland" on Justia Law

This case concerned attorney fees under the dissenters' rights provisions of the Washington Limited Liability Company Act (LLC Act). The issue was first considered two years ago when the Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney fees imposed on Humphrey Industries Ltd. (Humphrey) and remanded to the trial court to reconsider an award of attorney fees in Humphrey's favor. On remand, the trial court awarded Humphrey part of its fees but also reinstated part of the attorney fee award against Humphrey that the Supreme Court had reversed. Humphrey appealed directly to the Supreme Court, contending that the trial court on remand failed to follow the Supreme Court's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by imposing fees on Humphrey. View "Humphrey Indus., Ltd. v. Clay St. Assocs." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to address the exclusiveness of a statutory appraisal remedy provided to minority shareholders in certain merger scenarios under Pennsylvania corporate law. Where there is a fair value dispute, the BCL provides for post-merger judicial valuation or appraisal of the shares. Mitchell Partners, L.P., was a minority shareholder of Irex Corporation. In 2006, Irex participated in a merger structured so that some minority shareholders would be "cashed out" and would not receive an equity interest in the surviving corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of North Lime Holdings Corporation. Mitchell objected to the acquisition. The merger proceeded nonetheless, and Irex commenced valuation proceedings in state court to address the dispute with Mitchell. Meanwhile, Mitchell pursued common law remedies in a diversity action in federal court, naming as defendants Irex, its directors, most of its officers, and North Lime. The defendants sought dismissal on the ground that, under Section 1105 of the BCL, judicial valuation was the sole remedy available to dissenting shareholders in the post-merger timeframe. A divided three-judge panel of the Third Circuit reversed the superior court in favor of Mitchell. Defendants sought rehearing, and the Governor of Pennsylvania and several business groups moved for leave to file supportive amicus briefs. The Governor expressed particular concern that the Third Circuit had interpreted the BCL's provisions relating to dissenting shareholders' rights in a manner inconsistent with Commonwealth case law. Accordingly, he urged the Third Circuit to grant rehearing and certify a question of law to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court, in response to the certified question, Section 1105 (of the BCL) "precludes postmerger remedies other than appraisal only in the absence of fraud or fundamental unfairness."View "Mitchell Partners, L.P., Aplt v. IREX Corporation" on Justia Law

In a derivative action on behalf of Hewlett-Packard Company, plaintiff accused certain HP directors of committing waste and breaching the duty of care in connection with the August 2010 termination of then-CEO, Hurd. Plaintiff contends that Hurd was not entitled to, and did not deserve, any severance upon his termination but that the directors granted Hurd a severance package estimated to be worth $40 million or more. Plaintiff also challenged the lack of a long term CEO succession plan as a breach of the directors’ duty of care. The chancellor dismissed. Under Rule 23.1, a stockholder must either make a demand on the board to instigate the legal action that the stockholder seeks to bring on the corporation’s behalf or allege with particularity why such a demand is excused. Plaintiff did not to make a presuit demand and did not adequately allege a basis to excuse presuit demand.View "Zucker v. Andreessen" on Justia Law

A stockholder of Republic, a Delaware corporation that engages in waste hauling and waste disposal, filed a derivative suit based on Republic’s compensation decisions: that a payment to O’Connor was made without consideration and was, therefore, wasteful; that an incentive payment to O’Connor was wasteful because it was not tax-deductible and rendered Republic’s compensation plan not tax-deductible; that Directors paid themselves excessive compensation; that Directors breached their duty of loyalty and wasted corporate assets by awarding a certain type of stock option; and that Directors improperly awarded employee bonuses because the requirements of the bonus scheme under which the bonuses were awarded were not met. The chancellor dismissed all but the claim arising from the board’s granting itself stock awards.View "Frank David Seinfeld v. Donald W. Slager, et al." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a derivative complaint challenging a corporate board's decision to pay certain executive bonuses without adopting a plan that could make those bonuses tax deductible states a claim for waste. The trial court concluded that the complaint failed to allege with particularity, that the board's decision not to implement a so-called "Section 162(m)" plan was a decision that no reasonable person would have made. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Freedman v. Adams, et al." on Justia Law