Justia Corporate Compliance Opinion Summaries

Three individuals (once known as the "Bad Boys' of Chicago Arbitrage") established "Loop" as a closely-held corporation for their real estate holdings in 1997. A family trust for Loop's corporate secretary (50% owner) owns Banco, which gave Loop a $9.9 million line of credit in 2000. On the same day, Loop subsidiaries entered into a participation agreement on the line of credit through which they advanced $3 million to Loop, giving the subsidiaries senior secured creditor status over Loop's assets. The now-creditor subsidiaries were also collateral for funds loaned Loop. In 2001 Loop received a margin call from Wachovia. The Banco-Loop line of credit matured and Loop defaulted. Banco extended and expanded the credit. Loop’s debt to Wachovia went unpaid. Loop invested $518,338 in an Internet golf reservation company; moved real estate assets to Loop Properties (essentially the same owners); and paid two owners $210,500 “compensation” but never issued W-2s. Wachovia obtained a $2,478,418 judgment. The district court pierced Loop’s corporate veil, found the owners personally liable, and voided as fraudulent Banco’s lien, the “compensation” payments, and payments to the golf company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the golf company. View "Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Banco Panamericano, Inc." on Justia Law

Under Internal Revenue Code 1361(a) and 1362(a)(1), qualifying small business corporations could affirmatively elect S corporation status for federal income tax purposes. Under Internal Revenue Code 1363(a) and 1366(a)(1)(A), an S corporation's "profits pass through directly to its shareholders on a pro rata basis and are reported on the shareholders' individual tax returns." At issue was whether a corporate taxpayer was ineligible for S corporation status, and therefore must be taxed as a C corporation, because its sole shareholder was a custodial Roth IRA. Taproot contended that a Roth IRA could not be distinguished from its individual owner under a reasonable interpretation of the governing statute. Adhering to this construction, Taproot thus argued that it satisfied the S corporation requirements. The court agreed with the Tax Court that Revenue Ruling 92-73 provided persuasive guidance that IRAs were ineligible for S corporation shareholders. Here, the 2004 amendment, coupled with the prior legislative history, unequivocally supported the IRS's interpretation of the S corporation statute and promulgation of Revenue Ruling 92-73. The court also agreed with the IRS's narrow interpretation of Treasury Regulation 1.1361-1(e)(1), restricting its application of custodial accounts in which corporate dividends were taxed in the year received. Moreover, the court found persuasive the IRS's opinion that ownership of custodial IRAs and Roth IRAs should not be attributed to the underlying individual for purposes of S corporation eligibility. Accordingly, the decision of the Tax Court was affirmed. View "Taproot Admin. Serv. v. CIR" on Justia Law

This case arose when Mirant, an energy company, sought to expand its European operations by acquiring nine power islands from General Electric. When the power island deal fell through, Mirant made payments pursuant to a guaranty and soon thereafter sought bankruptcy protection. Mirant, as debtor-in-possession, sued Commerzbank and other lenders in bankruptcy court to avoid the guaranty and to recover the funds Mirant paid pursuant to the guaranty. After Mirant's bankruptcy plan was confirmed MCAR, plaintiff, substituted into the case for Mirant. Commerzbank and other lenders, defendants, filed a motion to dismiss based on Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court subsequently denied defendants' motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's alleged lack of standing. Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants. Both sides appealed. While the court agreed that the district court correctly determined that there was standing to bring the avoidance claim, the court vacated the judgment of dismissal because the district court erroneously applied Georgia state law rather than New York state law to the avoidance claim. View "MC Asset Recovery LLC v. Commerzbank A.G., et al." on Justia Law

Karen Cook was appointed receiver over the assets of a number of related corporations and individuals, who the SEC alleged violated multiple federal securities laws. Cook discovered that before the SEC filed its civil complaint, the corporate entities involved had made charitable contributions to the American Cancer Society (ACS). Cook moved to recover the donations on behalf of the receivership, arguing that they qualified as fraudulent transfers under Texas' Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA), Tex. Bus. & Co. Code 24.005(a). The court held that the receiver's attempt to liken the scheme in question to a "Ponzi-like fraud," and therefore reduce her burden to proving "presumed intent to defraud," failed for lack of evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "The American Cancer Society v. Cook" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment of the district court granting defendants' motion to dismiss and denying as moot plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on liability. The District Court held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim, under a variety of theories, based on defendants' purchase and possession of an interest in the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Egypt. The court concluded that the facts alleged in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, if true, told a tragic story of religious discrimination in Egypt in the 1960s and the court understood the desire for compensation. However, that wrong, if it did indeed occur, was inflicted by the Egyptian government, not by defendants. Because the district court correctly determined that the Amended Complaint failed to state a claim against defendants and also therefore correctly denied plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as moot, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Bigio v. The Coca-Cola Co." on Justia Law

Continental sold its food and beverage metal can and can-end technology to Crown via a stock purchase agreement (SPA) in March 1990. The parties disputed the extent of each other's resultant liabilities, as defined by the indemnity provision in the SPA in concurrent binding arbitration and judicial proceedings. Continental subsequently appealed the grant of summary judgment and the district court's denial of its motion to reconsider or alter or amend its judgment. The court found that Continental failed to meet its burden of proving it was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the meaning of the indemnity provision. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that Continental was precluded from further litigating the provision's meaning, properly granted summary judgment in favor of Crown, and did not abuse its discretion in denying Continental's motion to reconsider. View "Continental Holdings, Inc. v. Crown Holdings Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are personal investment holding corporations owned by two related Panamanian shareholders. Defendants, of who there are two distinct groups, are (1) a related group of banking corporations operating under the umbrella of Banco Santander, which provide banking, investment, and other financial management services; and (2) certain individual officers/employees of Santander. This dispute arose from plaintiff's investment of an undisclosed sum of money with defendants. At issue was whether a district court, having found a valid contract containing an arbitration clause existed, was also required to consider a further challenge to that contract's place within a broader, unexecuted agreement. Having considered those circumstances in light of Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters and other relevant precedent, the court found that the district court properly construed the law regarding arbitrability in dismissing plaintiff's suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Solymar Investments, Ltd., et al. v. Banco Santander S.A., et al." on Justia Law

McKesson, a United States company, claimed that after the Islamic Revolution, the government of Iran expropriated McKesson's interest in an Iranian dairy (Pak Dairy) and withheld its dividend payments. McKesson filed its complaint in 1982, the case reached the court on five prior occasions, and was remanded by the court for numerous trials by the district court. At issue was whether the court had jurisdiction over McKesson's claim and whether any recognized body of law provided McKesson with a private right of action against Iran. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the act of state doctrine did not apply in this case. While the court reversed the district court's holding that McKesson could base its claim on customary international law, the court affirmed the district court's alternative holding that the Treaty of Amity, construed as Iranian law, provided McKesson with a private right of action, and the court further affirmed the district court's finding that Iran was liable for the expropriation of McKesson's equity interest in Pak Dairy and the withholding of McKesson's dividend payments. Finally, the court reversed the district court's award of compound interest and remanded for calculation of an award consisting of the value of McKesson's expropriated property and withheld dividends plus simple interest. View "McKesson Corp., et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

Relators brought a qui tam action against defendant and its subsidiaries, alleging violations of the reverse false claim provision of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(7). Relators subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal, with prejudice, of their third amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court held that relators failed to allege with particularity, as required by Rule 9(b), that defendants knowingly made false statements for the purpose of concealing or avoiding an obligation to pay money to the government. Count I alleged that the 2008 Certification of Compliance was false due to the failure to report or remit the million dollars in identified Overpayments, and that defendants made and used the Certification to conceal and avoid the obligation to remit Overpayments. Count II involved the same obligation to remit Overpayments within thirty days but was based on a separate scheme and separate false records. The court held that relators have sufficiently pled each element of a reverse false claim for the Certification of Compliance and the district court's dismissal of Count I was reversed. The court also held that relators have pled all the remaining elements for a reverse false claim for the Discovery Samples and thus, the district court's dismissal of Count II was reversed. View "Matheny, et al. v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought separate suits alleging unlawful retaliation by their corporate employers, which are private companies that act as contract advisers to and managers of mutual funds organized under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The district court addressed both cases in a single order, holding that the whistleblower protection provision within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. 1514A extends beyond "employees" of "public" companies to encompass employees of private companies that are contractors or subcontractors to those public companies if the employees report violations "relating to fraud against shareholders." The First Circuit reversed, concluding that the protections are limited to employees of public companies, as defined by the statute. View "Lawson v. FMR LLC" on Justia Law