Justia Corporate Compliance Opinion Summaries

Chevron, the franchisor, brought suit for declaratory judgment against one of its franchised dealers, M&M Petroleum Services, Inc. M&M responded with a counterclaim of its own, a counterclaim that was not only found to be frivolous, but the product of perjury and other misconduct. The court held that had M&M merely defended Chevron's suit, it could not have been held liable for attorneys' fees. The court held, however, that in affirmatively bringing a counterclaim that was reasonably found to be frivilous, M&M opened itself up to liability for attorneys' fees under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 2805(d)(3). Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that Chevron was eligible to recover attorneys' fees, nor did the district court abuse its discretion in determining that M&M's counterclaim was frivolous and awarding attorneys' fees to Chevron under section 2805(d)(3). View "Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. M&M Petroleum Servs, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a fallout of a $3.65 billion Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Minnesota businessman Thomas J. Petters. Appellants, investment funds (collectively, Ritchie), incurred substantial losses as a result of participating in Petters' investment scheme. Ritchie subsequently sued two officers of Petters' companies, alleging that they assisted Petters in getting Ritchie to loan over $100 million to Petters' company. Ritchie's five-count complaint alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(a), (c)-(d), common law fraud, and tortious inference with the contract. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that Ritchie's action was barred by a Receivership Order. The court also rejected arguments challenging the sufficiency of Ritchie's pleadings in the common law fraud count and did not to address other arguments related to abstention, lack of causation, and absolute privilege. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ritchie Capital Mgmt., et al. v. Jeffries, et al." on Justia Law

This matter involved the interpretation of a limited liability company operating agreement. Petitioner (Showell) was a member of an accounting firm (Hoyt) and respondents (Pusey and Hatter) were the remaining members of the LLC at the time. In early 2007, Showell "retired" from Hoyt. Showell subsequently asked the court to construe the provisions of the Hoyt Operating Agreement to determine what value, if any, Showell was due for his interest in Hoyt as a consequence of his departure from the company. The court held that Showell was entitled to receive his share of the liquidation value of Hoyt as of the date of his "retirement" from the company. View "Showell v. William H. Pusey, Richard H. Hatter and Robert M. Hoyt & Co., LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerned the bankruptcy estate of Qualia Clinical Service, Inc. The estate's Chapter 7 Trustee sought to avoid as a preferential transfer a security interest recorded by one of Qualia's creditors shortly before the bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) held the security interest voidable. The court held that the bankruptcy court and the BAP properly applied 11 U.S.C. 547(c)(5)(A) to conclude that the preferential transfer in this case, though it concerned an interest in accounts receivable, improved Inova Capital Funding, LLC's position as against Qualia's other creditors and so was not exempt from avoidance under that subsection. The court found Inova's remaining arguments unpersuasive. View "Lange v. Inova Capital Funding, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant on his claim of malicious prosecution under Arkansas law. The district court held that plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment on two of the five elements necessary to sustain his claim. The court held that the district court erred in holding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain plaintiff's claim that defendant brought suit against him on the guaranty without probable cause. The court also held that a jury must decide what was defendant's motive or purpose in suing plaintiff if it in fact understood it had no reasonable chance of prevailing on the merits of its claim against plaintiff. View "Stokes v. Southern States Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from numerous trademark and unfair competition claims over the name "Patsy's." Patsy's Italian Restaurant appealed, and Patsy's Pizzeria cross-appealed, from a judgment of the district court after a jury trial on claims brought pursuant to trademark and unfair competition law. The court upheld the district court's jury instructions; affirmed the district court's refusal to grant a new trial on the issue of whether Patsy's Pizzeria made fraudulent statements to the Patent and Trademark Office, as well as its refusal to vacate the jury's verdict that Patsy's Italian Restaurant did not fraudulently obtain its trademark registrations; affirmed the district court's refusal to reinstate Patsy's Pizzeria's trademark registrations; and upheld the district court's denial of attorneys' fees and injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Patsy's Italian Restaurant, Inc., et al. v. Banas, et al." on Justia Law

WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl (WPP) appealed from the district court's dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant and cross-appellants cross-appealed the district court's decision to dismiss some of WPP's claims without prejudice. WPP generally alleged violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78(a), that amidst large operating losses unknown to investors, Spot Runner executives solicited WPP to buy shares in it at the same time that executives of the company were selling personally owned shares. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) fraudulent scheme against all of the defendants, the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5(b) fraudulent omissions claim against the general counsel for Spot Runner and Spot Runner, and the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5 insider trading claim against Spot Runner. The court reversed the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5(b) omission claims against the founders of Spot Runner. View "WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl, et al. v. Spot Runner, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute between a hedge fund manager and the hedge fund's seed investor. The central issue was contractual and involved whether the hedge fund manager could use the Gate Provision in the Partnership Agreement to lock up the seed investor. The court held that the hedge fund manager's refusal to honor the withdrawal request and return the seed investor's capital in full was a violation of the Seeder Agreement and a breach of contract. The court held that, in the alternative, even if the Gates were potentially applicable, it was a breach of fiduciary duty for the hedge fund manager to use the Gates solely for a selfish reason. Therefore, the court ordered the immediate return to the seed investor of all of its capital and awarded interest to compensate it for the delay. The court also disposed of several other claims raised by the hedge fund manager and the seed investor. View "Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC, et al. v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC et al." on Justia Law

This appeal involved a contract dispute between Bart Enterprises International, Ltd. (Bart Enterprises), and its assignees (Bart Group), and Walter Mercado Salinas (Mercado) where the contract described Bart Enterprises as being "in the business of producing and distributing entertainment programming," and described Mercado as "a well-known psychic and astrologer who provide[d] psychic and astrological counseling to the public." The court held that the district court did not err in denying the Bart Group's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages; the district court did not abuse its discretion by striking the Bart Group's six proposed expert witnesses; the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant the Bart Group a new trial on damages based on the sufficiency of the evidence; there was nothing wrong with the judge's closing comment; the district court did not err by denying the Bart Group's motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative, to amend the judgment to include nominal damages; and because the court had determined that there were no errors constituting an abuse of discretion, there was no accumulation of error either. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Walter Int'l Prod., et al. v. Walter Mercado Salinas, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the bankruptcy court's approval of a multi-million dollar, global settlement in one of the largest Ponzi scheme bankruptcies in American history. The settlement had been substantially consummated and the appeal had been rendered largely moot. The court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement where the record upon which the bankruptcy court based its approval of the settlement was sufficient and where the settlement satisfied the Flight Transportation/Drexel factors. Accordingly, the order of the bankruptcy court approving the settlement was affirmed. View "Interlachen Harriet Investment v. Kelley, et al." on Justia Law