Justia Corporate Compliance Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Corporate Compliance
by
The case concerns a dispute between LKQ Corporation and its former Plant Manager, Robert Rutledge, who resigned from the company and joined a competing firm. LKQ sought to recover proceeds Rutledge realized from multiple stock sales over many years, based on a forfeiture-for-competition provision in their Restricted Stock Unit Agreements.The key legal issue revolves around the applicability of Delaware law on forfeiture-for-competition provisions. These provisions require former employees to forfeit a monetary benefit upon joining a competitor. The Delaware Supreme Court held in a recent case that such provisions are not subject to a reasonableness review. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found it unclear whether this ruling applies outside the context of highly sophisticated parties.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment in favor of Rutledge on the breach of the Restrictive Covenant Agreements and unjust enrichment claims. However, due to the complexity of the Delaware law issue, the Court decided to certify questions to the Delaware Supreme Court for clarification. Specifically, the certified questions ask whether the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling on forfeiture-for-competition provisions applies outside the limited partnership context and, if not, what factors inform its application. View "LKQ Corporation v. Rutledge" on Justia Law

by
The case involves Applied Medical Distribution Corporation (Applied) suing its former employee, Stephen Jarrells, for misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of a contract governing Applied’s proprietary information, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted Applied’s posttrial motion for a permanent injunction and awarded Applied partial attorney fees, costs, and expenses.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that Applied was the prevailing party on the misappropriation cause of action and was entitled to a permanent injunction to recover its trade secrets and prevent further misappropriation. The court also found that Applied was entitled to an award of the reasonable attorney fees, costs, and expenses it incurred to obtain injunctive relief.However, the court disagreed with the trial court's decision to mechanically award only 25 percent of the incurred attorney fees and costs because Applied prevailed on only one of four claims it asserted. The court found that the trial court erred in how it determined the amount awarded by failing to address the extent to which the facts underlying the other claims were inextricably intertwined with or dependent upon the allegations that formed the basis of the one claim on which Applied prevailed. The court also found that the trial court erred in excluding certain expert witness fees from the damages calculation presented to the jury.Finally, the court concluded that the trial court erred by granting a nonsuit on whether Jarrells’s misappropriation was willful and malicious, and remanded for a jury trial on this issue. If the jury finds the misappropriation was willful and malicious, the court shall decide whether attorney fees and costs should be awarded to Applied and, if so, in what amount. View "Applied Medical Distribution Corp. v. Jarrells" on Justia Law

by
In the case of West Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Moelis & Company, the plaintiff, a stockholder of Moelis & Company (the "Company"), challenged the validity of certain provisions in a Stockholder Agreement between the Company and its CEO, Ken Moelis. The agreement gave Moelis extensive pre-approval rights over the Company's board of directors' decisions, the ability to select a majority of board members, and the power to determine the composition of any board committee. The plaintiff argued that these provisions violated Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), which mandates that the business and affairs of a corporation be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as otherwise provided in the DGCL or in the corporation's certificate of incorporation.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware agreed with the plaintiff, holding that the Pre-Approval Requirements, the Board Composition Provisions, and the Committee Composition Provision in the Stockholder Agreement were facially invalid under Section 141(a) of the DGCL. The court found that these provisions effectively transferred the management of the corporation to Moelis, contrary to Section 141(a). The court reasoned that while Delaware law generally favors private ordering, the ability to contract is subject to the limitations of the DGCL, including Section 141(a). The court emphasized that a provision may be part of a corporation's internal governance arrangement, and thus subject to Section 141(a), even if it appears in a contract other than the corporation's charter or bylaws.However, the court found that certain provisions were not facially invalid, including Moelis’ right to designate a number of directors, the requirement for the Company to nominate Moelis’ designees, and the requirement for the Company to make reasonable efforts to enable Moelis’ designees to be elected and continue to serve. View "West Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Moelis & Company" on Justia Law

by
In 2022, Fox Corporation and Snap Inc. amended their corporate charters to exculpate their officers from damages liability for breaches of the duty of care. The amendments were authorized by recent Delaware legislation. The companies' Class A non-voting common stockholders claimed that these amendments deprived them of their power to sue officers for damages for duty of care violations and, thus, a separate class vote was required to approve the amendments. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision that a separate class vote was not required. The court held that the ability to sue directors or officers for duty of care violations was a general right of the stockholders, not a class-based power stated in the corporate charter. Therefore, it was not a "power, preference, or special right" of the Class A common stock under Section 242(b)(2) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which requires a separate class stockholder vote to amend a corporate charter if the amendment would adversely affect the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class. The holding was based on long-standing precedent and the court's interpretation of related sections of the Delaware General Corporation Law. View "In re Fox Corporation/Snap Inc. Section 242 Litigation" on Justia Law

by
In the case before the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Vince Hardaway brought an action against his employer, Howard Industries, Inc., claiming bad faith denial of his workers’ compensation benefits for temporary partial disability due to carpal tunnel syndrome. Howard Industries had contracted CorVel Enterprise, a third-party claims administrator, to manage workers’ compensation claims. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Howard Industries, finding that the company's conduct did not constitute gross negligence or an independent tort.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-125(1), Howard Industries was permitted to delegate its duty to administer employee workers’ compensation claims to CorVel. The Court also determined that Hardaway failed to provide sufficient evidence that Howard Industries acted with actual malice or gross negligence in denying his benefits. Therefore, his claims did not survive summary judgment. The court held that any failure to pay benefits by Howard Industries under these circumstances did not amount to gross negligence. View "Hardaway v. Howard Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Adroit Medical Systems, Inc., Grazyna Gammons, Kelley Patten, and Gene Gammons. The plaintiff, Scott Gammons, alleged that his father and stepfamily, who controlled the family business, Adroit, were diverting company funds for personal use without accounting for tax consequences. He claimed that after he reported their financial misdeeds to the IRS, they fired him. Scott brought an action under federal and state whistleblower statutes and state common law.The court found that while Scott’s reporting of alleged financial malfeasance to the IRS was protected conduct and may have contributed to his termination, the defendants had clear and convincing evidence that they would have fired Scott due to his attempted hostile takeover of the company, irrespective of his whistleblowing. Scott had obtained an emergency conservatorship over his father, Gene, which he used to control the family business. When the conservatorship was dissolved, the defendants regained control and promptly fired Scott.Scott also brought claims under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (TPPA) and state common law. The court found that Scott failed to show that the defendants’ legitimate reason for terminating him was pretextual. The court also rejected Scott’s state common law claims, holding that the individual defendants were immune from tortious interference claims as they were acting within their corporate capacities and did not personally benefit from Scott’s termination. View "Gammons v. Adroit Medical Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

by
In the case before the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, plaintiff and counterclaim-defendant Ted D. Kellner sought to challenge certain bylaws adopted by AIM ImmunoTech Inc., defendant and counterclaim-plaintiff, and its board of directors. Kellner, Deutsch, and Chioini sought to nominate themselves as director candidates for AIM's 2023 annual meeting. Kellner claims that AIM's advance notice bylaws, which were amended in 2023, are invalid and inequitable. He also asserts that the Board's rejection of his nomination notice was improper.The court found that four out of six challenged provisions of AIM's amended bylaws were inequitable and therefore invalid. These provisions were found to be overly broad and ambiguous, effectively obstructing the stockholder franchise and providing the Board with undue discretion to reject a nomination. The court also found that Kellner's notice complied with the remaining, valid bylaws and that AIM's rejection of the notice was therefore improper.The court's decision means that Kellner's nominees must be included on the ballot for AIM's 2023 annual meeting. The four invalid provisions of the bylaws have been struck down and are of no force or effect. The remaining provisions of the bylaws, which were not challenged, stand. In essence, the court found that AIM's board of directors overstepped in its efforts to ward off a proxy contest, and in doing so, it infringed on the rights of stockholders. View "Kellner v. AIM Immunotech Inc., et al." on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the lower court's decision that A.C. & C.E. Investments, Inc. (AC&CE) did not properly plead a derivative action and lacked standing to bring a direct claim in a lawsuit against Eagle Creek Irrigation Company (Eagle Creek). AC&CE, a shareholder of Eagle Creek, a nonprofit mutual irrigation corporation, challenged amendments made to Eagle Creek's bylaws and articles of incorporation that increased the number of capital shares the corporation was authorized to issue and removed a provision that Eagle Creek would hold all the water rights it acquired “in trust” for the benefit of its shareholders. AC&CE claimed Eagle Creek breached its fiduciary duty and requested that the district court declare the proposed amendments void. However, the district court concluded that AC&CE's complaint did not properly plead a derivative action, that AC&CE lacked standing to bring a direct claim, and that the amendments were validly adopted by a majority shareholder vote. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed these conclusions. The court also found that AC&CE's claim regarding the increase in the number of authorized capital shares was not ripe for adjudication because no additional shares had been issued. Finally, the court affirmed the lower court's denial of Eagle Creek's request for attorney fees. View "A.C. & C.E. Investments, Inc. v. Eagle Creek Irrigation Company" on Justia Law

by
A case involving Lebanon County Employees' Retirement Fund and Teamsters Local 443 Health Services & Insurance Plan, as plaintiffs-appellants, and Steven H. Collis, Richard W. Gochnauer, Lon R. Greenberg, Jane E. Henney, M.D., Kathleen W. Hyle, Michael J. Long, Henry W. McGee, Ornella Barra, D. Mark Durcan, and Chris Zimmerman, as defendants-appellees, was heard by the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. The plaintiffs, shareholders in AmerisourceBergen Corporation, brought a derivative complaint against the directors and officers of the Corporation alleging that they failed to adopt, implement, or oversee reasonable policies and practices to prevent the unlawful distribution of opioids. The plaintiffs claimed that this led to AmerisourceBergen incurring liability exceeding $6 billion in a 2021 global settlement related to the Company's role in the opioid epidemic. The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware initially dismissed the complaint, basing its decision on a separate federal court finding that AmerisourceBergen had complied with its anti-diversion obligations under the Controlled Substances Act. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery's dismissal of the complaint, ruling that the lower court had erred in considering the federal court's findings as it changed the date at which demand futility should be considered and violated the principles of judicial notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lebanon County Employees' Retirement Fund v. Collis" on Justia Law

by
In 2020, Illumina, a for-profit corporation that manufactures and sells next-generation sequencing (NGS) platforms, which are crucial tools for DNA sequencing, entered into an agreement to acquire Grail, a company it had initially founded and then spun off as a separate entity in 2016. Grail specializes in developing multi-cancer early detection (MCED) tests, which are designed to identify various types of cancer from a single blood sample. Illumina's acquisition of Grail was seen as a significant step toward bringing Grail’s developed MCED test, Galleri, to market.However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) objected to the acquisition, arguing that it violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition. The FTC contended that because all MCED tests, including those still in development, relied on Illumina’s NGS platforms, the merger would potentially give Illumina the ability and incentive to foreclose Grail’s rivals from the MCED test market.Illumina responded by creating a standardized supply contract, known as the "Open Offer," which guaranteed that it would provide its NGS platforms to all for-profit U.S. oncology customers at the same price and with the same access to services and products as Grail. Despite this, the FTC ordered the merger to be unwound.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the FTC had applied an erroneous legal standard in evaluating the impact of the Open Offer. The court ruled that the FTC should have considered the Open Offer at the liability stage of its analysis, rather than as a remedy following a finding of liability. Furthermore, the court determined that to rebut the FTC's prima facie case, Illumina was not required to show that the Open Offer would completely negate the anticompetitive effects of the merger, but rather that it would mitigate these effects to a degree that the merger was no longer likely to substantially lessen competition.The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the FTC’s conclusions regarding the likely substantial lessening of competition and the lack of cognizable efficiencies to rebut the anticompetitive effects of the merger. However, given its finding that the FTC had applied an incorrect standard in evaluating the Open Offer, the court vacated the FTC’s order and remanded the case for further consideration of the Open Offer's impact under the proper standard. View "Illumina v. FTC" on Justia Law