Justia Corporate Compliance Opinion Summaries

This matter involved the interpretation of a limited liability company operating agreement. Petitioner (Showell) was a member of an accounting firm (Hoyt) and respondents (Pusey and Hatter) were the remaining members of the LLC at the time. In early 2007, Showell "retired" from Hoyt. Showell subsequently asked the court to construe the provisions of the Hoyt Operating Agreement to determine what value, if any, Showell was due for his interest in Hoyt as a consequence of his departure from the company. The court held that Showell was entitled to receive his share of the liquidation value of Hoyt as of the date of his "retirement" from the company. View "Showell v. William H. Pusey, Richard H. Hatter and Robert M. Hoyt & Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that defendant had a personal bank account at Fulton Financial Corporation (Fulton), of which his wife could be a joint holder. Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order enjoining both defendant and his wife from using the funds or removing them from Fulton, pending a final disposition of its claim that the funds were wrongfully removed by defendant from plaintiff's account. The court held that while the complaint stated a colorable claim, the court was unpersuaded that irreparable harm would result absent the entry of a restraining order, ex parte. The court also held that where, as here, the plaintiff sought to freeze the funds of an account legally held, not only by the alleged wrongdoer but jointly by an innocent third party, a request for ex parte action raised concerns of due process. Therefore, since plaintiff failed to show that irreparable harm would occur absent entry of a temporary restraining order ex parte, the court deferred decision on the restraining order request pending service and an opportunity for defendant to be heard. View "Smart Home, Inc. v. Selway, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute between Omniglow, LLC's three members (Leemon, Holland, and Achaian). At issue was whether one member of a Delaware limited liability company could assign its entire membership interest, including that interest's voting rights, to another existing member, notwithstanding the fact that the limited liability company agreement required the affirmative consent of all of the members upon the admission of a new member, or, must the existing member assignee be readmitted with respect to each additional interest it acquired after its initial admission as a member. The court held that the answer depended in the first instance on the specific provisions governing the transferability of Interests in Omniglow's LLC Agreement. When Omniglow's LLC Agreement was read as a whole, as it must be, it allowed an existing Member to transfer its entire Membership Interest, including voting rights, to another existing Member without obtaining the other Members' consent. Thus, Holland's assignment of its 30% Interest to an existing member, Achaian, was effective to vest all of the rights associated with that Interest in Achaian, and Omniglow now had two coequal 50% Members. View "Achaian, Inc. v. Leemon Family LLC, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute between a hedge fund manager and the hedge fund's seed investor. The central issue was contractual and involved whether the hedge fund manager could use the Gate Provision in the Partnership Agreement to lock up the seed investor. The court held that the hedge fund manager's refusal to honor the withdrawal request and return the seed investor's capital in full was a violation of the Seeder Agreement and a breach of contract. The court held that, in the alternative, even if the Gates were potentially applicable, it was a breach of fiduciary duty for the hedge fund manager to use the Gates solely for a selfish reason. Therefore, the court ordered the immediate return to the seed investor of all of its capital and awarded interest to compensate it for the delay. The court also disposed of several other claims raised by the hedge fund manager and the seed investor. View "Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC, et al. v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when Commerzbank agreed to acquire Dresdner Bank in September 2008. As part of the deal, Commerzbank also acquired Dresdner Bank's trust preferred structures, and holders of Dresdner's trust preferred securities received distributions in both 2009 and 2010. Plaintiff claimed that paying those distributions "pushed," or required Commerzbank to make distributions on, a class of its owned preferred securities in which plaintiff had an interest, and, by the complaint, plaintiff asked the court to enforce that alleged obligation. Plaintiff also sought specific performance of a support agreement that was argued to require the elevation of the liquidation preference of Commerzbank's trust preferred securities in response to a restructuring of one class of the Dresdner securities. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court held, among other things, that because the DresCap Trust Certificates did not qualify as either Parity Securities, defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law regarding plaintiff's claim under the Pusher Provision. The court also held that because DresCap Trust Certificates did not qualify as either Parity Securities or Junior Securities, Section 6 of the Support Undertaking was not triggered by amendment of the DresCap Trust IV Certificates. Accordingly, defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law regarding plaintiff's claim that the amendment of the DresCap Trust IV Certificates required defendants to amend the Trusted Preferred Securities.View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. Commerzbank Capital Funding Trust II, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, shareholders of Ness Technologies, Inc. (Ness), moved to expedite proceedings in this putative class action, which they filed to enjoin a proposed transaction through which Ness's largest shareholder, Citi Venture Capital International (CVCI), would, through a wholly owned subsidiary, acquire Ness in a cash transaction at $7.75 per share (Proposed Transaction). Plaintiffs contended that the Proposed Transaction was the product of a flawed sales process and that the members of the Board, aided and abetted by CVCI, breached their fiduciary duties to plaintiffs and the class by approving the transaction. Plaintiffs asserted both price and process claims and claims that the Board's disclosures regarding the Proposed Transaction were inadequate. The court held that plaintiffs' Motion for Expedited Proceedings was granted only to the extent that they could take expedited, but necessarily limited and focused, discovery regarding the question of whether either the Board's or the Special Committee's financial advisors were conflicted because of their relationships with CVCI. The motion was denied in all other aspects. View "In re Ness Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a sale-leaseback transaction that occurred in 2001. On July 10, 2011, the seller-lessees' parent company announced plans for a proposed transaction whereby it would seek a new credit facility and undergo an internal reorganization. As part of a subsequent reorganization, substantially all of its profitable power generating facilities would be transferred from existing subsidiaries to new "bankruptcy remote" subsidiaries, except for two financially weakened power plants. On July, 22, 2011, plaintiffs brought this action seeking to temporarily restrain the closing of the proposed transaction on the grounds that it violated the successor obligor provisions of the guaranties and would constitute a fraudulent transfer. The court found it more appropriate to analyze plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order under the heightened standard for a preliminary injunction. Having considered the record, the court held that plaintiffs have failed to show either a probability of success on the merits of their breach of contract and fraudulent transfer claims or the existence of imminent irreparable harm if the transaction was not enjoined. Therefore, the court denied plaintiffs' application for injunctive relief. View "Roseton Ol, LLC, et al. v. Dynegy Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this lawsuit to challenge the approximately $42.5 million acquisition of American Surgical Holdings, Inc. (American Surgical) by AH Holdings, Inc. Now before the court was plaintiff's interim application for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses where plaintiff contended that an award of $450,000 was appropriate under Delaware law and would compensate his attorneys for bringing this action, which he argued resulted in American Surgical's corrective disclosures in its definitive proxy statement. The court denied plaintiff's Interim Application for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses as it was premature where the amount of $450,000 was interim in nature because plaintiff's price and process claims remained viable. The court held that it would reconsider the application once plaintiff's remaining claims have been litigated. View "Frank v. Elgamal" on Justia Law

This action arose from a technology-sharing relationship between plaintiffs and defendant where plaintiffs brought suit against defendant in January 2009 for, among other things, breach of contract based on defendant's alleged failure to perform its end of a bargain the parties had struck. Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Having considered the parties' extensive submissions and their presentations at the argument held on March 1, 2011, the court decided to deny both motions because numerous issues of material fact remained in dispute. Nonetheless, the court made several summary judgment findings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) regarding certain discrete issues where the facts were without substantial controversy. View "Petroplast Petrofisa Plasticos S.A. v. Ameron Int'l Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former shareholders and the representative and attorney-in-fact for all shareholders of Kinexus Corporation (Kinexus), commenced this action asserting claims against Advent Software, Inc. (Advent) for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising out of a December 31, 2001 agreement entered into by Advent to acquire Kinexus. Advent subsequently moved to dismiss the action because of Kinexus' failure to prosecute and Advent argued that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate under Court of Chancery Rules 41(b) and 41(e). The court held that Advent's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute was denied where the court was not convinced that these circumstances necessitated dismissal because of the court's preference for resolving cases on the merits and because Kinexus appeared to have renewed their efforts to diligently prosecute the matter. Accordingly, counsel were requested to confer and to promptly submit a case scheduling order so that discovery could be completed and a trial date could be established. View "Kinexus Representative LLC v. Advent Software, Inc." on Justia Law