Justia Corporate Compliance Opinion Summaries

This action was before the court on a motion to expedite regarding a transaction in which a Delaware limited partnership was to be acquired for either cash or a combination of cash and the acquirer's stock. Plaintiff-unitholders of the target claim that the process undertaken by the conflicts committee was deficient and therefore, legally ineffective because it failed to consider the fairness of payments made to certain conflicted parties and the independence of the conflicts committee members was tainted by a grant of unvested phantom units they received shortly before merger discussion began. Plaintiffs also contended that the directors failed to provide adequate disclosures to enable the unitholders to make an informed decision as to whether to vote for the transaction. Plaintiffs also asserted that they will suffer irreparable harm if prompt equitable relief was not granted because the general partner of the target was controlled by three allegedly single-purpose entities whose sole assets were their interests in the general partner. As a result, plaintiffs asserted that these entities would become empty shells unless they were prevented from distributing the consideration they received in the transaction. The court held that plaintiffs have shown that at least one of their claims was colorable but plaintiffs' allegations were simply to speculative to support the required showing of irreparable harm. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs' motion to expedite.

Plaintiffs, limited partners of Cencom Cable Income Partnership, L.P. ("Partnership"), sued defendants over the appraisal and sale of nine cable systems. In this post-trial memorandum opinion, the court addressed not only the import of the disclosures that a certain law firm, which had been retained to assure that plaintiffs' rights would be protected, had been retained to assure that the process would be "fair" to plaintiffs, but also plaintiffs' other challenges, including primarily whether the general partner manipulated to its benefit the process by which the partnership assets were valued and sold and whether approval by the limited partners of the sales process, which established a price and provided for interest on that amount following a date certain until distribution of the sales proceeds, acted to deprive plaintiffs of the right to any quarterly distributions following the start of the period during which interest would be paid. The court held that the appraisal and sale process did not deny plaintiffs the benefit of their bargain. Under the circumstances, it was fair and, to the extent that certain obligations were not precisely met, plaintiffs were not damaged. Accordingly, the court held that defendants were entitled to the entry of judgment in their favor and the dismissal of the action.

Plaintiffs, stockholders in Massey Energy Company ("Massey"), a coal mining corporation with a controversial reputation, sought a preliminary injunction against a Merger Agreement with a mining company, with a good reputation and track record for miner safety and regulatory compliance, because the Massey Board did not negotiate to have the pending "Derivative Claims" transferred into a litigation trust for the exclusive benefit of Massey stockholders. The court held that plaintiffs had not proven that the Merger's consummation presented them with a threat of irreparable harm and therefore, denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction.

Plaintiff, a significant stockholder in a holding company managed by the individual defendants, alleged, both on behalf of a class and derivatively, breaches of fiduciary duty regarding defendants' adoption of a stock buyback plan, their adoption of an options plan, issuance of the options to themselves, and the decision by the company to vote in favor of a transaction involving the sale of a subsidiary's interest in a third entity. At issue was whether the court should grant defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss Count II only with regard to the claim that defendants' vote of Winmill & Co. Incorporated's ("Winmill") interest in Bexil Corporation in favor of the York Insurance Services Group, Inc. sale was self-interested and unfair to Winmill. The court otherwise granted defendants' motion to dismiss.

This matter involved a stockholder challenge to a merger in which a third-party strategic aquiror had agreed to merge with the target corporation for consideration valued at $35 per share. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and requested that the court delay the target's stockholder vote and enjoin the deal protections for a period of 45-60 days so as to allow the target to seek higher bids. The court first addressed the issue of whether and in what circumstances Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. applied when merger consideration was split roughly evenly between cash and stock. Based on its analysis, the court held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their argument that the approximately 50% cash and 50% stock consideration triggered Revlon. Therefore, when the board explored whether to enter into the proposed transaction, which warranted review under Revlon, its fiduciary duties required it to obtain the best value reasonably available to Smurfit-Stone stockholders. The court held, however, that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to prove they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, would suffer imminent irreparable harm in injunctive relief was not granted, and were favored by the equities. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction was denied.

Plaintiffs, and its wholly owned subsidiary, proposed to split off as a new publicly traded company ("SplitCo") the businesses, assets, and liabilities attributed to plaintiffs' Capital Group and Starz Group (the "Capital Splitoff"). At issue was whether plaintiffs pursued a "disaggregation strategy" designed to remove assets from the corporate structure against which the bondholders had claims and shifted the assets into the hands of plaintiffs' stockholders. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to judgment declaring that the Capital Splitoff, as currently structured, complied with the Successor Obligor Provision in an indenture dated July 7, 1999 and therefore, plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that the Capital Splitoff did not violate the Successor Obligor Provision.