Justia Corporate Compliance Opinion Summaries

A group of AIM ImmunoTech, Inc. stockholders believed the board was mismanaging the company and initiated a campaign to elect new directors. This effort included two felons convicted of financial crimes. The board rejected two nomination attempts under its bylaws, leading to a lawsuit. The Court of Chancery denied the insurgents' request for a preliminary injunction, citing factual disputes. The insurgents, led by Ted D. Kellner, made a third attempt to nominate directors. The board amended its bylaws to include new advance notice provisions and rejected Kellner's nominations for non-compliance. Kellner filed suit.The Court of Chancery invalidated four of the six main advance notice bylaws and reinstated a 2016 bylaw. The court upheld the board's rejection of Kellner's nominations for failing to comply with the remaining bylaws, including the reinstated 2016 provision. Kellner argued that the court improperly used the 2016 bylaw and that the amended bylaws were preclusive and adopted for an improper purpose. The defendants contended that the court erred in invalidating the bylaws and that they withstood enhanced scrutiny.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the AIM board identified a legitimate threat to its information-gathering function but acted inequitably by adopting unreasonable bylaws to thwart Kellner's proxy contest. The court held that the board's primary purpose was to interfere with Kellner's nominations and maintain control. Consequently, the court declared the amended bylaws unenforceable. The judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed in part and reversed in part, closing the case. View "Kellner v. AIM ImmunoTech Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a group of pension funds (plaintiffs) who filed a lawsuit against Inovalon Holdings, Inc., and its board of directors (defendants), challenging an acquisition of Inovalon by a private equity consortium led by Nordic Capital. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties and unjustly enriched themselves through the transaction. They also alleged that the company's charter was violated because the transaction treated Class A and Class B stockholders unequally.In the lower court, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. They argued that the transaction satisfied the elements of a legal framework known as MFW, which would subject the board's actions to business judgment review. The Court of Chancery granted the defendants' motions to dismiss in full.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery. The Supreme Court found that the lower court erred in holding that the vote of the minority stockholders was adequately informed. The Supreme Court determined that the proxy statement issued to stockholders failed to adequately disclose certain conflicts of interest of the Special Committee’s advisors. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the transaction did not comply with the MFW framework, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Sarasota Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2022, Fox Corporation and Snap Inc. amended their corporate charters to exculpate their officers from damages liability for breaches of the duty of care. The amendments were authorized by recent Delaware legislation. The companies' Class A non-voting common stockholders claimed that these amendments deprived them of their power to sue officers for damages for duty of care violations and, thus, a separate class vote was required to approve the amendments. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision that a separate class vote was not required. The court held that the ability to sue directors or officers for duty of care violations was a general right of the stockholders, not a class-based power stated in the corporate charter. Therefore, it was not a "power, preference, or special right" of the Class A common stock under Section 242(b)(2) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which requires a separate class stockholder vote to amend a corporate charter if the amendment would adversely affect the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class. The holding was based on long-standing precedent and the court's interpretation of related sections of the Delaware General Corporation Law. View "In re Fox Corporation/Snap Inc. Section 242 Litigation" on Justia Law

A case involving Lebanon County Employees' Retirement Fund and Teamsters Local 443 Health Services & Insurance Plan, as plaintiffs-appellants, and Steven H. Collis, Richard W. Gochnauer, Lon R. Greenberg, Jane E. Henney, M.D., Kathleen W. Hyle, Michael J. Long, Henry W. McGee, Ornella Barra, D. Mark Durcan, and Chris Zimmerman, as defendants-appellees, was heard by the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. The plaintiffs, shareholders in AmerisourceBergen Corporation, brought a derivative complaint against the directors and officers of the Corporation alleging that they failed to adopt, implement, or oversee reasonable policies and practices to prevent the unlawful distribution of opioids. The plaintiffs claimed that this led to AmerisourceBergen incurring liability exceeding $6 billion in a 2021 global settlement related to the Company's role in the opioid epidemic. The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware initially dismissed the complaint, basing its decision on a separate federal court finding that AmerisourceBergen had complied with its anti-diversion obligations under the Controlled Substances Act. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery's dismissal of the complaint, ruling that the lower court had erred in considering the federal court's findings as it changed the date at which demand futility should be considered and violated the principles of judicial notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lebanon County Employees' Retirement Fund v. Collis" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants and cross-appellees, Gregory Holifield (“Holifield”) and GH Blue Holdings, LLC (“Blue”), appealed a Court of Chancery memorandum opinion in favor of plaintiff- appellee and cross-appellant, XRI Investment Holdings LLC (“XRI”). The issue this case presented was whether Holifield validly transferred his limited liability membership units in XRI to Blue on June 6, 2018. The resolution of that issue bore on the ultimate dispute between the parties (not at issue here) on whether XRI validly delivered to Holifield a strict foreclosure notice purporting to foreclose on the XRI membership units, or whether such notice was incorrectly delivered to him because Blue was, in fact, the owner of the units following the transfer. Following a one-day trial, the Court of Chancery determined that the transfer of the units from Holifield to Blue was invalid because it was not a permitted transfer under XRI’s limited liability company agreement, which provided that noncompliant transfers of XRI interests were “void.” The trial court, in interpreting the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in CompoSecure, L.L.C. v. CardUX, LLC, 206 A.3d 807 (Del. 2018), held that the use of the word “void” in XRI’s LLC agreement rendered the transfer incurably void, such that affirmative defenses did not apply. Despite this holding, the trial court, in dicta, further found that XRI had acquiesced in the transfer. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Court of Chancery’s judgment with respect to the Blue Transfer, but reversed the judgment insofar as it precluded XRI’s recovery for breach of contract damages and recoupment of legal expenses advanced to Holifield. The Court held that the trial court’s finding of acquiescence as to only one of the alleged breaches did not bar either remedy, and the Court remanded the case for the trial court to make further determinations. View "Holifield v. XRI Investment Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

The corporate charter of a bank holding company capped at 10% the stock that could be voted by a “person” in any stockholder vote. During a proxy contest for three seats of a staggered board, the CCSB board of directors instructed the inspector of elections not to count 37,175 shares voted in favor of a dissident slate of directors. According to the board, the 37,175 shares exceeded the 10% voting limitation because certain stockholders were acting in concert with each other. If the votes had been counted, the dissident slate of directors would have been elected. The CCSB corporate charter also provided that the board’s “acting in concert” determination, if made in good faith and on information reasonably available, “shall be conclusive and binding on the Corporation and its stockholders.” In a summary proceeding brought by the plaintiffs, the Court of Chancery found: (1) the “conclusive and binding” charter provision invalid under Delaware corporate law; (2) the board’s instruction to the inspector of elections invalid because the individuals identified by the board were not acting in concert; and (3) the board’s election interference did not withstand enhanced scrutiny review. The court also awarded the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees for having conferred a benefit on CCSB. CCSB argued the Court of Chancery erred when it invalidated the charter provision and reinstated the excluded votes. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery: plaintiffs proved that the board breached its duty of loyalty by instructing the inspector of elections to disregard the 37,175 votes. "The charter provision cannot be used to exculpate the CCSB directors from a breach of the duty of loyalty. Further, the court’s legal conclusion and factual findings that the stockholders did not act in concert withstand appellate review." View "CCSB Financial Corp. v. Totta" on Justia Law

Marion Coster and Steven Schwat – the two UIP Companies stockholders who each owned fifty percent of the company – deadlocked after attempting several times to elect directors. In response to the director election deadlock, Coster filed a petition for appointment of a custodian for UIP. The UIP board responded by issuing stock to a long-time employee representing a one-third interest in UIP. The stock issuance diluted Coster’s ownership interest, broke the deadlock, and mooted the custodian action. Coster countered by requesting that the Delaware Court of Chancery cancel the stock issuance. After trial, the Court of Chancery found that the stock sale met the most exacting standard of judicial review under Delaware law – entire fairness. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the court erred by evaluating the stock sale solely under the entire fairness standard of review, reasoning that even though the stock sale price might have been entirely fair, issuing stock while a contested board election was taking place interfered with Coster’s voting rights as a half owner of UIP. Therefore, the court needed to conduct a further review to assess whether the board approved the stock issuance for inequitable reasons. If not, the court still had to decide whether the board, even if it acted in good faith, approved the stock sale to thwart Coster’s leverage to vote against the board’s director nominees and to moot the custodian action. To uphold the stock issuance under those circumstances, the board had to demonstrate a compelling justification to interfere with Coster’s voting rights. On remand, the Court of Chancery found that the UIP board had not acted for inequitable purposes and had compelling justifications for the dilutive stock issuance. Upon return, the Supreme Court agreed with the court’s assessment and "appreciate[d] its work to address the issues remanded for reconsideration." View "Coster v. UIP Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue before the Delaware Supreme Court in this case was the 2016 all-stock acquisition of SolarCity Corporation (“SolarCity”) by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”). Tesla’s stockholders claimed CEO Elon Musk caused Tesla to overpay for SolarCity through his alleged domination and control of the Tesla board of directors. At trial, the foundational premise of their theory of liability was that SolarCity was insolvent at the time of the Acquisition. Because the Court of Chancery assumed, without deciding, that Musk was a controlling stockholder, it applied Delaware’s most stringent "entire fairness" standard of review, and the Court of Chancery found the Acquisition to be entirely fair. In this appeal, the two sides disputed various aspects of the trial court’s legal analysis, including, primarily, the degree of importance the trial court placed on market evidence in determining whether the price Tesla paid was fair. Appellants did not challenge any of the trial court’s factual findings. Rather, they raised only a legal challenge, focused solely on the application of the entire fairness test. After careful consideration, the Delaware Supreme Court was convinced that the trial court’s decision was supported by the evidence and that the court committed no reversible error in applying the entire fairness test. View "In Re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litigation" on Justia Law

The Delaware Court of Chancery was asked to resolve a dispute between a company and one of its former directors over the meaning of a stock option agreement and option grant notice. Applying the plain text of the agreement, the Court of Chancery determined that the dispute was to be resolved in accordance with a board committee’s interpretation of the agreement and notice. After the board, acting through a committee, interpreted the agreement and notice in a manner favorable to the company, the Court of Chancery, without hearing further from the former director, promptly dismissed the former director’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Delaware Supreme Court found the Court of Chancery properly stayed the action to permit the board’s committee to interpret the agreement and notice in the first instance. The Supreme Court disagreed, however, with the court’s decision to dismiss the former director’s complaint without any meaningful review of the committee’s interpretation. The Court of Chancery’s order of dismissal was therefore reversed, and the case remanded for a review of the committee’s conclusions. View "Terrell v. Kiromic Biopharma, Inc." on Justia Law

The Delaware Court of Chancery entered judgment in favor of appellee Sharon Hawkins on her request for a declaration that the irrevocable proxy which provided appellant W. Bradley Daniel (“Daniel”) with voting power over all 100 shares of N.D. Management, Inc. (“Danco GP”) (the “Irrevocable Proxy”), did not bind a subsequent owner of such Danco GP shares. The Court of Chancery also held that an addendum to the Irrevocable Proxy did not obligate the current owner of the Danco GP shares, MedApproach, L.P. (the “Partnership”), to demand that the buyer in a sale to an unaffiliated third party bind itself to the Irrevocable Proxy. Daniel appealed the Court of Chancery’s judgment that the Irrevocable Proxy did not run with the Majority Shares, arguing the court erred by: (1) rather than interpreting and applying the plain language of the Irrevocable Proxy as written, the court relied on the Restatement (Third) of Agency, which was not adopted until nearly a decade after the parties entered into the Irrevocable Proxy; (2) reading additional language into the Irrevocable Proxy in order to support its finding that the broad “catch-all” language that the parties included to prevent termination of the Irrevocable Proxy did not encompass a sale of the shares; and (3) not giving effect to all of the terms of the Irrevocable Proxy and improperly limiting the assignment clause of the Irrevocable Proxy so as not to bind assigns of the stockholder. Finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery. View "Daniel v. Hawkins" on Justia Law