Justia Corporate Compliance Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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The plaintiff, William Boggs, was injured on August 9, 2016, while transferring liquid asphalt from a tanker truck to a distribution truck in Framingham, Massachusetts. He was sprayed with liquid asphalt, resulting in burns and permanent injuries. Boggs was employed by All States Asphalt, Inc. (All States), which accepted his workers' compensation claim. Boggs filed a complaint against Johnston Asphalt, LLC, alleging negligence in maintaining the truck that caused his injuries.The Kent County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Johnston Asphalt on February 27, 2024. The court found no genuine issues of material fact and concluded that Johnston Asphalt owed no duty to Boggs. The court noted that the truck was owned and maintained by All States, and the only person who worked on the truck was an All States employee, Michael Kelly. The court also rejected Boggs' argument to pierce the corporate veil, finding no evidence that Johnston Asphalt and All States were not separate entities.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that Boggs failed to present competent evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding Johnston Asphalt's duty of care. The court found that the single piece of mail addressed to Kelly at Johnston Asphalt's address was insufficient to establish that Kelly was an employee of Johnston Asphalt. The court also upheld the lower court's decision not to pierce the corporate veil, as Boggs did not meet the burden of proof required to disregard the corporate entity. View "Boggs v. Johnston Asphalt, LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, an investor and venture capitalist and the CEO of InterOil Corporation (“InterOil”), developed a business relationship. Throughout that relationship, Plaintiff (and “entities controlled and beneficially owned by him”) provided loans, cash advances, and funds to the CEO and InterOil. Plaintiff and the CEO continued to have a business relationship until 2016, at which point the CEO’s actions and words made Plaintiff concerned he would not receive his shares back from the CEO. In late 2017, as part of a larger suit against the CEO, Plaintiff and Aster Panama sued the J.P. Morgan Defendants for (1) breach of trust and fiduciary duty, (2) negligence, and (3) conspiracy to commit theft. The district court granted summary judgment on all counts relating to the J.P. Morgan defendants and awarded them attorneys’ fees under the Texas Theft Liability Act (“TTLA”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Under Texas law, the only question is whether the J.P. Morgan Defendants expressly accepted a duty to ensure the stocks were kept in trust for Plaintiff or Aster Panama. That could have been done by express agreement or by the bank’s acceptance of a deposit that contained writing that set forth “by clear direction what the bank is required to do.” Texas courts require a large amount of evidence to show that a bank has accepted such a duty. Here, no jury could find that the proffered statements and emails were sufficient evidence of intent from the J.P. Morgan Defendants to show an express agreement that they “owe[d] a duty to restrict the use of the funds for certain purposes.” View "Civelli v. J.P. Morgan Chase" on Justia Law

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A client who retained Plaintiff, the Law Corporation, to represent him in a marital dissolution action. The client assigned the judgments to Musick Peeler & Garrett LLC (Musick Peeler). In October 2019, the Law Corporation filed a motion (the setoff motion) in the superior court to set off against its judgment debt to Musick Peeler a debt that Dougherty allegedly owes to the Law Corporation. The client’s alleged tortious actions to hinder, delay, or defraud the Law Corporation in its efforts to collect on a 1999 default judgment prior to our opinion vacating that judgment and declaring it void in 2009. The trial court denied the motion and the Law Corporation appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that to the extent the Law Corporation incurred any fees or costs in connection with its defense against the collateral attack actions in California, they were incurred in defending actions by the client, not a third person. These actions, therefore, do not support a setoff claim based on the tort of another doctrine. Further, even if the Law Corporation’s motion was procedurally proper, the Law Corporation failed to support its setoff claims with relevant evidence and, therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. View "Karton v. Musick, Peeler, Garrett LLP" on Justia Law