Justia Corporate Compliance Opinion Summaries

Trostel was founded in 1858. By 2007 the founder's relations still owned about 11 percent of its stock. Smith, which owned the rest, decided to acquire remaining shares by freezeout merger. Trostel became Smith's wholly owned subsidiary. Notz, one of the Trostel great-grandchildren, who owned 5.5 percent of the stock, rejected proffered compensation of $11,900 per share (about $7.7 million). The rest of the outside investors accepted. In an appraisal action (Wis. Stat. 180.1330(1)), the district court denied Nost's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and concluded that fair value of the stock on the merger date was $11,900 per share. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Wisconsin's corporate is legislative, not contractual and does not block corporations from availing themselves of diversity jurisdiction. View "Albert Trostel & Sons Co. v. Notz" on Justia Law

A corporation that wants its shares to be traded on an exchange or through broker-dealers that make national markets must register the securities under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77j. Section 13(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 8m(a), requires the issuer to file periodic reports. Plaintiff registered securities and persuaded broker-dealers to make markets in them, but fell behind with its filings. After eight years, during which plaintiff fell farther behind, the SEC opened a formal proceeding. After a hearing and disclosure that plaintiff could not pay an auditor to certify recent financial statements, the SEC revoked plaintiff's registration; trading in its shares came to a halt. While judicial review was pending, plaintiff filed a new registration, which has not been revoked despite plaintiff's failure to catch up on reports. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the case as moot. To commence trading in any newly registered stock, a broker-dealer needs approval from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. When a potential market-maker sought approval, it noted SEC comments on plaintiff's new registration. Setting aside the SEC revocation decision would not oblige FINRA to allow trading to resume. View "Tara Gold Resources Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases sought judicial review of notices of final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA) issued to Bemont and BPB. Following the review of the district court, the government appealed the ruling on the partnerships' motion for partial summary judgment disallowing the 40% valuation misstatement penalty, and the ruling post trial holding that the FPAA issued to Bemont for the 2001 tax year was time-barred. The partnerships appealed the district court's judgment upholding the imposition of the 20% substantial understatement and negligence penalties. The court reversed the judgment of the district court that the FPAA as to the 2001 tax year was untimely; affirmed the judgment of the district court in all other respects including disallowing the 40% valuation misstatement penalty and upholding the 20% negligence penalty for both 2001 and 2002. View "Bemont Investments, L.L.C., et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

Holston sued LanLogistics for breach of contract when LanLogistics never gave Holston an opportunity to match Gartlan's offer to purchase LanBox. Holston was a citizen of Florida and LanLogistics was incorporated in Delaware, maintaining its corporate headquarters in Miami, Florida. But by the time Holston filed suit, LanLogistics had dissolved and formally forfeited its authority to conduct business in Florida. At issue on appeal was the citizenship of a dissolved corporation for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and whether summary judgment was appropriately entered where there could have been a genuine issue of material fact. The court held that LanLogistics was only a citizen of Delaware and the court had subject matter jurisdiction where LanLogistics dissolved and formerly withdrew from business before Holston filed suit. The court reversed the district court's supplemental summary judgment order and remanded for a determination regarding the fair market value of each company in the package deal to identify the percentage of the purchase price used to purchase LanBox. View "Holston Investments Inc. B.V.I., et al. v. LanLogistics, Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed derivative actions asserting claims against Fannie Mae's directors regarding accounting irregularities. The district court entered three orders now on appeal, substituting Fannie Mae's conservator, the FHFA, for plaintiff shareholders. The court affirmed the orders but reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The court also held that dismissal on the grounds of claim preclusion was moot. View "Kellmer v. Raines, et al." on Justia Law

In 2010 the Seventh Circuit held that California law applied to plaintiff’s securities fraud claims and remanded because California, unlike federal securities law, permits a person who did not purchase or sell stock in reliance on a fraudulent representation to sue for damages. On remand the district court dismissed, ruling that the complaint did not adequately allege defendants' state of mind and plaintiff's reliance on particular false statements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff never explained how he could have avoided loss on his shares, had there been earlier disclosure. Mismanagement, not fraud, caused the loss. Any fraud just delayed the inevitable and affected which investors bore the loss. Plaintiff cannot show that earlier disclosure would have enabled him to sell and shift the loss to others before the price dropped.View "Anderson v. AON Corp." on Justia Law

Three individuals (once known as the "Bad Boys' of Chicago Arbitrage") established "Loop" as a closely-held corporation for their real estate holdings in 1997. A family trust for Loop's corporate secretary (50% owner) owns Banco, which gave Loop a $9.9 million line of credit in 2000. On the same day, Loop subsidiaries entered into a participation agreement on the line of credit through which they advanced $3 million to Loop, giving the subsidiaries senior secured creditor status over Loop's assets. The now-creditor subsidiaries were also collateral for funds loaned Loop. In 2001 Loop received a margin call from Wachovia. The Banco-Loop line of credit matured and Loop defaulted. Banco extended and expanded the credit. Loop’s debt to Wachovia went unpaid. Loop invested $518,338 in an Internet golf reservation company; moved real estate assets to Loop Properties (essentially the same owners); and paid two owners $210,500 “compensation” but never issued W-2s. Wachovia obtained a $2,478,418 judgment. The district court pierced Loop’s corporate veil, found the owners personally liable, and voided as fraudulent Banco’s lien, the “compensation” payments, and payments to the golf company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the golf company. View "Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Banco Panamericano, Inc." on Justia Law

Under Internal Revenue Code 1361(a) and 1362(a)(1), qualifying small business corporations could affirmatively elect S corporation status for federal income tax purposes. Under Internal Revenue Code 1363(a) and 1366(a)(1)(A), an S corporation's "profits pass through directly to its shareholders on a pro rata basis and are reported on the shareholders' individual tax returns." At issue was whether a corporate taxpayer was ineligible for S corporation status, and therefore must be taxed as a C corporation, because its sole shareholder was a custodial Roth IRA. Taproot contended that a Roth IRA could not be distinguished from its individual owner under a reasonable interpretation of the governing statute. Adhering to this construction, Taproot thus argued that it satisfied the S corporation requirements. The court agreed with the Tax Court that Revenue Ruling 92-73 provided persuasive guidance that IRAs were ineligible for S corporation shareholders. Here, the 2004 amendment, coupled with the prior legislative history, unequivocally supported the IRS's interpretation of the S corporation statute and promulgation of Revenue Ruling 92-73. The court also agreed with the IRS's narrow interpretation of Treasury Regulation 1.1361-1(e)(1), restricting its application of custodial accounts in which corporate dividends were taxed in the year received. Moreover, the court found persuasive the IRS's opinion that ownership of custodial IRAs and Roth IRAs should not be attributed to the underlying individual for purposes of S corporation eligibility. Accordingly, the decision of the Tax Court was affirmed. View "Taproot Admin. Serv. v. CIR" on Justia Law

This case arose when Mirant, an energy company, sought to expand its European operations by acquiring nine power islands from General Electric. When the power island deal fell through, Mirant made payments pursuant to a guaranty and soon thereafter sought bankruptcy protection. Mirant, as debtor-in-possession, sued Commerzbank and other lenders in bankruptcy court to avoid the guaranty and to recover the funds Mirant paid pursuant to the guaranty. After Mirant's bankruptcy plan was confirmed MCAR, plaintiff, substituted into the case for Mirant. Commerzbank and other lenders, defendants, filed a motion to dismiss based on Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court subsequently denied defendants' motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's alleged lack of standing. Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants. Both sides appealed. While the court agreed that the district court correctly determined that there was standing to bring the avoidance claim, the court vacated the judgment of dismissal because the district court erroneously applied Georgia state law rather than New York state law to the avoidance claim. View "MC Asset Recovery LLC v. Commerzbank A.G., et al." on Justia Law

Karen Cook was appointed receiver over the assets of a number of related corporations and individuals, who the SEC alleged violated multiple federal securities laws. Cook discovered that before the SEC filed its civil complaint, the corporate entities involved had made charitable contributions to the American Cancer Society (ACS). Cook moved to recover the donations on behalf of the receivership, arguing that they qualified as fraudulent transfers under Texas' Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA), Tex. Bus. & Co. Code 24.005(a). The court held that the receiver's attempt to liken the scheme in question to a "Ponzi-like fraud," and therefore reduce her burden to proving "presumed intent to defraud," failed for lack of evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "The American Cancer Society v. Cook" on Justia Law